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IN THE SIPREME COLRT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 20010056-SC 
v. : 
LUIS PENA-FLORES, : Priority No. 13 
Defendant/Petitioner. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDED T 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(5) (1999 & Supp 2001) 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Does Utah's prohibition against interfering with police "seeking to effect a 
lawful arrest or detention," authorize a suspect to resist an arrest whose technical 
legality under the Fourth Amendment is debatable?1 
On certiorari review, this Court reviews "the decision of the court of appeals, not 
the decision of the tnal court." State v. Harmon, 910 P 2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995) The 
court of appeals' decision is reviewed for correctness State v. James, 2000 UT 80, *J 8, 
13 P 3d 576 
'This same issue is raised in the unrelated case of State v. Trane, Case No 
20010068-SC, which is similarly pending before the Court on certiorari review 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Copies of any pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes (including amendments 
and legislative history), and rules are contained in addendum C, including: 
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-305 (1999) (interference statute); 
H.B. No. 85, 1981 LAWS OF UTAH ch. 62; 
H.B. No. 108,1990 LAWS OF UTAH ch. 274; 
House Debate, H.B. 85 (1980); 
Senate Debate, H.B. 108 (1990); 
House Debate, H.B. 108(1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charge. Petitioner was charged with interference, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-305 (1999) (R6). 
Motion to Dismiss Denied. A bench trial was held on 8 October 1999 (R23, 32). 
After the City rested, petitioner moved to dismiss on the grounds that the City failed to 
show a lawful detention existed; and/or the evidence was insufficient to establish 
petitioner knew police were seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention (R32:24-25). 
The trial court denied the motion without comment (R32:26). 
Conviction. Following closing arguments, petitioner was convicted as charged 
(R32:31-33). The trial court ruled as follows: 
. . . The key words here is (sic) the defendant had knowledge or that 
under the exercise of reasonable care should have had knowledge police 
officer was seeking to effect a lawful arrest or a detention. It's arrest or 
detention with knowledge. 
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I believe the Court then focuses on three. The defendant's refusal to 
refrain from performing any act that will impede the arrest or detention. It's 
not that the arrest- - . . . The focus here is the defendant's- -on number three 
of the statute, the defendant's refusal to refrain from performing any act 
will impede the arrest or detention. The testimony presented is the Court 
finds that he had reasonable knowledge. It was that he said he wasn't going 
to respond and asked others not to respond. I mean, there's no need to say 
that; if he had no knowledge that something was happening, he wouldn't 
have had to say that. The question here is his refusal to abstain from 
making those statements. 
In the totality of the circumstances, Court finds that the City has met 
it's burden, and that the defendant did interfere with the peace officer in 
making a lawful arrest. Seems to me- -or detention. Seems to me the 
charge may say, 'Interference with peace officer making a lawful arrest.' 
However, it is really pursuant to the statute three is 'or detention.' 
Whether they made a lawful arrest I think may or may not be the 
issue, but I don't think that's the issue. The issue here is 'or detention,' and 
whether he impeded the officer's performing any act to detain individuals 
and to gather information to then effectuate a lawful arrest. 
Court believes he had knowledge. I mean, there's no need to say, T 
won't answer questions,' or 'You don't need to answer questions,' if he had 
no knowledge that the officers were intending to gather information. The 
Court finds him guilty as charged. 
(Id.) (a copy of the ruling is contained in addendum B). 
Sentence. The trial court imposed jail time, but then suspended the jail term and 
placed defendant on a 12-month term of probation (R32:34). 
Direct Appeal. On direct appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's 
conviction for misdemeanor interference. American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2000 UT 
App 323,«[ 1, 14 P 3d 698, cert, granted, 26 P 3d 235 (Utah, May 18, 2001) (a copy is 
contained in addendum A). Petitioner claimed that he did not interfere with a lawful 
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arrest or detention because (a) no detention or arrest was effected; or alternatively, (b) if 
there was a detention, it lacked Fourth Amendment justification. Id. Addressing the first 
claim, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's determination that gang members were 
in fact detained: "we cannot say the trial court's conclusion that police had detained the 
gang members was clearly erroneous." Id. at ffl[ 6-8. 
Turning to petitioner's second claim, the court of appeals agreed with the trial 
court that the lawfulness of the detention under the Fourth Amendment was ultimately 
irrelevant. Id. atlflf 10-17. 
Although police must have reasonable suspicion in order to make a legal 
detention, the use of "lawful" in section 76-8-305 does not automatically 
incorporate this standard in determining whether a person is guilty of 
interfering with a peace officer. So long as a police officer is acting within 
the scope of his or her authority and the detention or arrest has the indicia of 
being lawful, a person can be guilty of interfering with a peace officer even 
when the arrest or detention is later determined to be unlawful. 
Id. at 11. In support, the court of appeals noted that this Court had previously decided 
similarly. Id. at f 12 (citing State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 575 (Utah 1991) (holding 
that fact that attempted search was later found unlawful did not divest officer of 
authority)). Acknowledging that Gardiner was arguably distinguishable on the ground 
that the case "involved a prior illegal police act which was superseded by a lawful arrest 
that formed the basis of the interference charge," the court of appeals determined that the 
distinction was "against the clear weight of authority and the language in the statute." Id. 
at f^ 13 (citing cases). 
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The court of appeals grounded its interpretation of section 76-8-305 in established 
rules of statutory construction, specifically noting that "[w]hen construing a statute, our 
primary purpose is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature in light of the purpose the 
statute was meant to achieve." Id. at 15 (quotation omitted). "Additionally, 'we presume 
that the Legislature used each term advisedly, and we give effect to each term according 
to its ordinary and accepted meaning." Id. (quotation omitted). Applying these rules, the 
court of appeals observed that petitioner's argument "that the statute requires a lawful 
arrest or detention reads out of the statute the phrase "seeking to effect." Id. at % 16. 
Thus, in light of Gardiner and progeny, and "the Legislature's inclusion of the "seeking 
to effect" language," the court of appeals determined that the interference statute "is 
intended to protect law enforcement officers who seek to discharge their official duties." 
M a t f 14. 
Finally, police here "were wearing clearly marked police uniforms," and were also 
detaining for investigation known gang members. Id. at Tf 17. Accordingly, the court of 
appeals held that "[w]hether the police had reasonable suspicion to justify this detention 
[was] immaterial to [petitioner's] conviction, because [petitioner] was in no position to 
determine on his own whether the officers' actions were lawfiil." Id. In other words, 
police acted in a manner "that had all the indicia of a lawful police detention"; therefore, 
petitioner's interference was sufficient to support a conviction under the section 76-8-
305(3). /</. at1|l8. 
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Certiorari Review Granted. Petitioner timely sought certioran review which this 
Court granted on 18 May 2001. See Pena-Flores, 26 P.3d 235 (Utah 2001). 
STATEiMENT OF THE FACTS 
The relevant facts are not in dispute and are set forth in Pena-Flores, 2000 UT 
App 323, ffl[ 2-4, add. A. 
On July 10, 1999, members of the Provo City Police Department 
were present in American Fork to help patrol the Steel Days carnival. 
Based on information received from street contacts and anonymous tips, 
police believed there was a possibility of gang activity. Additionally, 
police were aware of gang fights the previous night and a week earlier 
between the American Fork gang and a Payson gang. Based on reports, 
police believed that the Payson gang might be coming to American Fork to 
retaliate for the fight that occurred a week earlier. 
During the carnival, officers dressed in clearly marked police 
uniforms observed known gang members congregating in the back corner 
of the carnival. Having identified the gang members, the officer porceeded 
to interview them and fill out interview cards for their files. During this 
process, police targeted certain individuals, whom they identified by tattoos 
and monikers, and escorted them to the front of the carnival, where the 
officers filled out interview cards and photographed them. 
While police were interviewing the gang members, defendant, who 
was associating with them, but who was not known to police, told his 
friends that they did not have to talk with police or allow the police to take 
their pictures. The police officers told defendant to shut his mouth and step 
back from the situation. Defendant, however, persisted in telling his 
friends that they did not have to cooperate. At this point Officer Leavitt 
told defendant he had become "part of the party" and instructed him to 
come up to the front to be interviewed. Once defendant was taken to the 
front, Officer Leavitt asked him for some identification. Defendant told 
Officer Leavitt that he did not have to show him his identification. Officer 
Leavitt asked defendant if he had any identification with him. Defendant 
responded that he had some in his pocket. Officer Leavitt told defendant to 
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show him, and removed the identification. After a bench trial, defendant 
was convicted of interfering with a peace officer. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals properly determined that Utah's statutory prohibition of 
interference with police "seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention" forbids non-
forceful resistance to an arrest or detention of debatable validity under the Fourth 
Amendment. Contrary to petitioner's claim, the court of appeals' interpretation does not 
sanction unreasonable searches and seizures, but rather, merely transfers the right of 
redress for an alleged Fourth Amendment wrong from the street, with its potential for 
violence, to the orderly procedure of a courtroom. The court of appeals' interpretation is 
grounded in the plain language of the statute and is supported by sound public policy first 
pronounced in State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991). 
ARGUMENT 
UTAH'S PROHIBITION AGAINST INTERFERING WITH POLICE 
-SEEKING TO EFFECT A LAWFUL ARREST OR DETENTION" 
DOES NOT AUTHORIZE A SUSPECT TO RESIST AN ARREST 
WHOSE TECHNICAL LEGALITY UNDER THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT IS DEBATABLE 
The court of appeals upheld petitioner's conviction on the ground that police 
detaining gang members for investigation acted within the scope of law enforcement 
authority and with the indicia of lawfulness. American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2000 
UT App 323, «j<j 10-18, 14 P.3d 698, add. A. On certiorari, petitioner does not dispute 
the court of appeals holding that a detention occurred, but claims the court of appeals 
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nonetheless erred because Utah's interference statute contemplates non-forceful 
resistance by a suspect who disputes that an arrest or detention is ultimately supported by 
reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause. Pet. Br. at 6. In other words, petitioner 
interprets UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-305 (1999), as providing that, where police initiate 
an arrest or detention that is unlawful under the Fourth Amendment, suspects are free to 
resist without fear of prosecution for interference. Petitioner's interpretation is contrary 
to the plain language of the interference statute and the sound public policy recognized in 
State v. Gardiner, 814 P 2d 568 (Utah 1991), and progeny. 
A. The Court of Appeals' Interpretation of the Interference 
Statute is Consistent With Both the Plain Language of the 
Statute and Sound Public Policy. 
In Point 1(A) of his brief, petitioner claims that court of appeals' interpretation of 
section 76-8-305 ignores the plain language of the statute.2 Pet. Br. at 7-10 However, 
as demonstrated below, it is petitioner's interpretation which ultimately fails to give 
effect to each term in the interference statute and thus ignores its plain meaning 
The court of appeals correctly held that where, as here, police act within the scope 
of their authority in "seeking to effect" an investigative detention, petitioner had no right 
to interfere under section 76-8-305. Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323, «fl[ 10-18 See also 
Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 575-76. Indeed, Gardiner rejects the notion of any "generally 
available common law right to resist an illegal search or arrest." Id. at 574. Gardiner 
2
 A complete copy of the interference statute is contained in addendum C 
8 
instead directs that "%[i]f such a defense exists in Utah, it must be grounded in the specific 
code sections" at issue Id. As recognized in Gardiner, the common law right to resist 
has been subjected to "extensive cnticism/' and the "modem trend is to reject [it]." Id. at 
574-575. Thus, "the fine question of legality must be determined in subsequent judicial 
proceedings, not in the street." Id. at 574. The court of appeals' decision in this case is 
consistent with both the plain language of section 76-8-305 and the sound public policy 
recognized in Gardiner and progeny. See, e.g., J.H. By and Through D.H. v. West 
Valley City, 840 P 2d 115, 125 n.38 (Utah 1992) {Gardiner requires "a citizen faced with 
illegal police action to submit to the action or face potential criminal penalties if the 
action of the police officer is later found to be within the scope of his authority"), State v. 
Griego, 933 P 2d 1003, 1008 (Utah App. 1997) (upholding interference conviction on 
ground illegal entry and seizure of defendant did not justify resistance); Salt Lake City v. 
Smoot, 921 P 2d 1003,1010-1011 (Utah App.) (interpreting phrase "lawful command of a 
police officer" in city code as triggering scope of authority, rather than Fourth 
Amendment standard), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996). 
Notably, this is the first case after Gardiner to consider whether the plain 
language of section 76-8-305 gives rise to any right to resist police "seeking to effect a 
lawful arrest or detention." Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323, «fl[ 10-18. The court of 
appeals determined that section 76-8-305 did not necessarily require a lawful arrest or 
detention, in the Fourth Amendment sense, in order for a defendant to be charged with 
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interfering with a police officer. Id. at *[«[ 5, 11. Specifically, Pena-Flores recognizes 
that "police must have reasonable suspicion in order to make a legal detention," but that 
"the use of 'lawful' in section 76-8-305 does not automatically incorporate this standard 
in determining whether a person is guilty of interfering with a peace officer." Id. at f 11. 
Rather, "[s]o long as a police officer is acting within the scope of his or her authority and 
the detention or arrest has the indicia of being lawful, a person can be guilty of 
interfering with a peace officer even when the arrest or detention is later determined to be 
unlawful." Id. 
Consistent with Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574, the court of appeals analysis is 
grounded in established rules of statutory construction. Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323. 
at f 15. As recognized by the court of appeals, the "primary purpose" of statutory 
construction is "to give effect to the intent of the Legislature in light of the purpose the 
statute was meant to achieve," and there is a presumption "that the Legislature used each 
term advisedly;" therefore, each term must be given effect "according to its ordinary and 
accepted meaning." Id. See also State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, f 25, 4 P.3d 795 ("In 
analyzing a statute's plain language, we must attempt to give each part of the provision a 
relevant and independent meaning so as to give effect to all of its terms."); In re 
Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 866 (Utah 1996) (same); Versluis v. Guaranty Nat'l Cos., 842 
P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992) ("[W]e presume that the Legislature used each term advisedly, 
and we give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning."). 
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Applying these rules, the court of appeals rejected petitioner's claim that Utah's 
interference statute requires an entirely lawful arrest or detention under the Fourth 
Amendment because that interpretation "reads out of the statute the phrase 'seeking to 
effect."' Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323,K 16. Cf. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 at 574 
(recognizing assault statutes does not require State to prove precise act officer is 
performing is not legally challengeable, i.e., that the arrest or search being effected is 
"entirely lawful and beyond challenge"). The statute requires not that the officers actuallv 
be effecting a lawful arrest, but that they be seeking to do so. In failing to give effect to 
the phrase, "seeking to effect," petitioner's interpretation contravenes an established rule 
of statutory construction. Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323, f 15. See Burns, 2000 UT 
56, f 25; In re Worthen, 926 P.2d at 866; Versluis, 842 P.2d at 867. 
Accordingly, even if the term "lawful" as used in section 76-8-305 did 
"automatically" incorporate the Fourth Amendment standard, the "seeking to effect" 
language reasonably gives police acting within the scope of law enforcement authority 
and the real world of field investigation the leeway to be mistaken. See Pena-Flores, 
2000 UT App 323, ffl[ 11, 16; cf. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994) 
(recognizing that in "real world" of field interrogations, police must make difficult 
judgment calls on a moments notice). The "seeking to effect" language of the 
interference statute also furthers this Court's recognition that the modern trend is away 
from the street justice of yesteryear and toward the "societal interest in the orderly 
11 
settlement of disputes citizens and their government." Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 572-574 
(quotation omitted). 
In sum, in light of "the Legislature's inclusion of the 'seeking to effect 
language/" in the interference statute, as well as the sound reasoning of Gardiner, Pena-
Flores correctly holds that section 76-8-305 "is intended to protect law enforcement who 
seek to discharge their official duties." Id. at | f 12, 14, 16. 
B. Because the Meaning of the Interference Statute is Plain, Resort 
to the Legislative History is Not Required; However, Even if the 
Court Does Consider the Legislative History it Should do so 
Cautiously. In Any Event, the Legislative History Does Not 
Necessarily Support Petitioner's Interpretation. 
In Point 1(B) of his brief, petitioner argues that if the Court finds that the term 
"lawful" as used in section 76-8-205 is ambiguous, the legislative history does not 
support the court of appeals' interpretation. Pet. Br. at 10-12. Rather, petitioner argues 
that statements by the sponsor of H.B. 85 in 1980 support his interpretation of the term 
"lawful" as used in the interference statute. Pet. Br. at 10-12, & addenda. 
As set forth previously, the court of appeals correctly determined that when effect 
is given to each term in the interference statute, including the prefatory "seeking to 
effect" language, it is plain that the legislature did not intend that an arrest or detention 
be "entirely lawful and beyond challenge." Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 at 574. Thus, resort 
to legislative history is not necessary. Even if the Court were to determine that the 
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interference statute is ambiguous and that the legislative history might therefore be 
helpful, it should nonetheless be viewed with caution. 
(1) Legislative History Should be Viewed With Caution. Floor debates, 
including statements by a bill's sponsor, are at best an uncertain guide to statutory 
construction. See 2 A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 
48.13 at 466 (6th ed. 2000 Revision). "The traditional view ruled out consideration of 
legislative debates under any circumstance." Id. at 469 Cf. State v. Kenison, 2000 UT 
App 322 <j 10, 14 P 3d 129 (declining to consider floor debates in construing statute), 
Alpine School Dist. Bd. ofEduc. v. State Tax Comm 'n, 2000 UT App 319,1} 11, 14 P 3d 
125 (same). But see Coleman v. Thomas, 2000 UT 53, f 18 n.4, 4 P.3d 783 (quoting, but 
not relying on, floor debate); Lopez v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 932 P.2d 601, 604 n.3 
(Utah 1997) (citing floor debate); Stouffer Food Corp. v. Labor Comm Jn, 970 P 2d 272, 
276 (Utah App.) (stating that review of Senate discussion "provides insight into the 
statute's purpose"), affd, 4 P.3d 1287 (Utah 2000). 
A sponsor's "remarks upon presenting the bill to the house and his answers to 
questions asked by members will be considered by the courts in construing provisions of 
the bill subsequently enacted into law." 2A SUTHERLAND § 48.14 at 473-74; § 48.15 at 
475-76. However, statements by sponsors must be evaluated cautiously: "the legislator 
who is identified as the sponsor of a bill often assumes that role at the instance of some 
pnvate party who is interested in passage of the bill." Id. § 48.15 at 477-78 In many 
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cases, "[t]he 'sponsor' in fact knows no more about the bill than anyone else." Id. See 
Day v. State ex rel, 1999 UT 46, \ 48, 980 P.2d 1171 (noting that sponsor "misstated the 
actual effect of the amendment"). 
The United States Supreme Court has noted that statements by a bill's sponsor are 
not controlling, but provide "evidence of legislative intent "when they are consistent with 
the statutory language and other legislative history." Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 
253, 263 (1986). Accord Consumer Product Safety Comm 'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 
U.S. 102, 118 (1980) ("ordinarily even the contemporaneous remarks of a single 
legislator who sponsors a bill are not controlling in analyzing legislative history"); Hogar 
Aguay Vida en el Desierto, Inc. v. Suarez-Medina, 36 F.3d 177, 185 n.8 (1st Cir. 1994) 
("inconsistent expressions of sponsor intent are insufficient to override the plain import of 
the statutory language"). See also Stavros v. Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel, 2000 UT 63, ^ 18, 15 P.3d 1013 (initiative sponsor's expression of purpose will 
be accorded no weight if it is at odds with the language of the initiative itself). 
In fact, since legislative debates are not promulgated, interpreting statutes by 
reference to them may erode the due process notice function of the statute. See State in 
reA.B. v. State, 936 P.2d 1091, 1097 (Utah App.) (citing 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, 
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.08 at 35 (5th Ed. 1992)), cert, denied, 945 
P.2d 1118 (Utah 1997). 
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Therefore, '"[i]n the game of statutory interpretation, statutory language is the 
ultimate trump card,' and the remarks of sponsors of legislation are authoritative only to 
the extent that they are compatible with the plain language" of the statute. United States 
v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1070 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting Rhode Island v. 
Narrangansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 699 (1st Cir. 1994)); accord State v. Hunt, 906 
P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995) ("[t]he best evidence of the true intent and purpose of the 
Legislature in enacting the Act is the plain language of the Act") (quoting Jensen v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984)); Garcia v. United 
States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984) ("only the most extraordinary showing of contrary 
intentions from [legislative history] would justify a limitation on the 'plain meaning' of 
the statutory language"). 
(2) The Legislative History Does Not Necessarily Support Petitioner's 
Interpretation of the Interference Statute. Petitioner argues that statements by the 
sponsor of H.B. 85 in 1980 support his interpretation of the interference statute. Pet. Br. 
at 10-12, & addenda. Taken as a whole, however, the floor debate on H.B. 85 does not 
compel the conclusion that the legislature contemplated resistance by individuals 
questioning the ultimate Fourth Amendment justification for an arrest or detention. The 
relevant portions of the debate follow: 
REP. HARRISON: This bill deals with the crime of resisting arrest. 
If you were to look in your Utah Code to 76-8-305 you wouldn't even find 
that statute in the books. Instead it would say "unconstitutional." The State 
supreme court in the case of State v. Bradshaw [541 P.2d 800 (Utah 1975)], 
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declared unconstitutional a statute dealing with resisting arrest. The reason 
it was declared unlawful was because primarily it did not require an 
affirmative showing by the prosecution that the arrest was a lawful arrest. 
Consequently we have put together a statute here, and the statewide 
association of prosecutors have been involved in this, which would now 
redefine this crime to require a lawful arrest. I'm having passed to you a 
memorandum which explains the situation. What we are trying to do is to 
get on the books a statute that would define the crime of resisting arrest and 
it would require a lawful arrest. I'd be glad to respond to any questions if 
there are any. 
REP. GARDNER: Could you just tell me to make sure I understand. 
Could you tell me what an unlawful arrest is? 
REP. HARRISON: An unlawful arrest, of course we're talking in 
general terms here, would be an arrest when the officer attempting to effect 
an arrest did not have reasonable grounds to do so, was not probable cause 
in any way, was trying to effect an arrest which was unlawful. 
REP. GARDNER: I guess what's troubling to me is not that I 
oppose your concept, but what's troubling me is that it seems to be it might 
be a matter of judgment as to what's lawful or unlawful. I might think its 
unlawful because I haven't done anything wrong - and I guess how do you -
who makes the decision as to whether there is sufficient reason? 
REP. HARRISON: Let me respond to that by indicating that 
what is and is not a lawful arrest I'm sure is the subject of numerous 
different lawsuits and court decisions, and I don't involve myself in the 
practice of criminal law so I couldn't define it too well. But I'm sure 
that the ultimate decision as to what is a lawful arrest would be 
something decided by court decision. And, I might add also that the 
statute which we have here has been patterned after a California statute 
which has been declared to be constitutional. 
REP. HILLYARD: Has consideration been given to the potential problem 
of say a knock on a door at 2 o'clock in the morning and a man saying that he's a 
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police officer and then proceeding to come in the home and for some reason vou 
seek to protect yourself or your home. To some protection, that were that the 
police officer either be properly identified or some type of protection to a private 
citizen who may be concerned about someone he does not know for sure to be a 
police officer? 
REP. HARRISON: Yes. The bill expressly requires that the person 
who is charged with this offense of resisting a lawful arrest must have 
knowledge that the person is a police officer or else in the exercise of 
reasonable care, he should have some information sufficient to be put on 
notice that the individual was a peace officer. So if the peace officer does 
not identify himself or if there's no reasonable basis for the person charged 
to know that this is a police officer then the elements of the crime would not 
be made out. 
REP. CHRISTIANSEN: Thank you Mr. Speaker. I don't know how-
many of you have been arrest. Hope not very many. But seems like there's 
been a couple in our state and if you go by the record there was, as I recall, 
304 officers assaulted. All they was trying to arrest you and I because we 
was breaking the law. I think this is too high a number and I support this 
bill. 
House Debate, H.B. 85 (1980), pp. 1-2 (emphasis added), add. B.3 
Several facts emerge from this debate. Representative Harrison, though clearly 
well-meaning, was a sponsor who "knows no more about the bill than anyone else/' 2 A 
SUTHERLAND § 48.15 at 477-78. Indeed, he appears to have been misinformed on the 
point at issue here. For example, he suggests that Bradshaw declared the interference 
statute unconstitutional because "it did not require an affirmative show ing by the 
3The parties have each prepared their own transcriptions of the 1980 House 
Debate. 
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prosecution that the arrest was a lawful arrest/1 House Debate (1980), p.I, add, B. 
Gardiner makes plain, however, that the Bradshaw majority struck the former 
interference statute down on vagueness grounds because it ";fail[ed] to inform an 
ordinary citizen who is seeking to obey the laws as to the conduct sought to be 
proscribed/" Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 568 (quoting Bradshaw, 541 P.2d at 802). Gardiner 
further points out that the Bradshaw majority did not decide "that a person had a right, 
constitutional or otherwise, to use force to resist an illegal arrest[.]" Id. (quoting 
Bradshaw, 541 P.2d at 801). Thus, to the extent the issue was addressed by the 
Bradshaw majority, it is dicta: "The majority's holding of unconstitutionality was based 
on vagueness alone. Any discussion of the substantive right to resist is dictum only, and 
this [C]ourt is not bound by earlier dicta/' Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 572. 
Further, after questioning by Rep. Gardner, Rep. Harrison recognized that the 
lawfulness of a detention or arrest is a difficult judgment call that is ultimately best made 
by the courts. House Debate (1980), pp. 1-2, add. B. It is therefore a reasonable 
inference that Rep. Harrison did not anticipate that the lawfulness of a particular arrest or 
detention would be debated and settled in the street, as opposed to the courtroom. See 
Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574 ("The fine question of legality must be determined in 
subsequent judicial proceedings, not in the street."). 
Additional questioning by Rep. Hillyard established the importance of police 
properly identifying themselves so that those individuals ordered to submit to an arrest or 
18 
detention might objectively know that they are dealing with a law enforcement officer and 
not an imposter. House Debate (1980), p.2, add. B. Finally, Rep. Christiansen 
emphasized his concern about the high number of police officers assaulted in the course 
of carrying out their law enforcement duties. Id. 
Thus, the House of Representatives passed H.B. 85 after being advised that the 
ultimate lawfulness of a police order would be determined in the courts, that there was 
legitimate concern about the nsks to law enforcement officers seeking to effect a lawful 
arrest or detention, and that the amendment sought to protect from prosecution 
individuals who resist because there was no objective basis for them to know they were 
resisting a legitimate law enforcement officer. Id. Taken as a whole, and contrary to 
petitioner's claim, the legislative history does not compel the conclusion that the 
legislature intended to create a right to resist police "seeking to effect a lawful arrest or 
detention." Section 76-8-305. Rather, it reasonably suggests the legislature contemplated 
that the ultimate lawfulness of police orders would be addressed in the courts, not in the 
streets. Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574. 
Additionally, while not addressed by petitioner, the 1990 amendments to section 
76-8-305 restructured the section and added subsections (2) and (3). See H.B No. 108, 
1990 LAWS OF UTAH ch. 274, add. B. Rep. Turtle, the House sponsor for H B. 108, 
remarked during the House Debate that 
[w]hat this bill does is if you interfere, knowingly interfere with an arrest of 
a person that's being apprehended by a policeman, this puts you in a Class 
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B misdemeanor park. If you know, if you're in a crowded area and the 
policeman says to do something and you don't hear it, you don't have to 
worry about it. But if you do knowingly know that you're avoiding arrest of 
you or the person you're trying to help, then you're in trouble. This is 
supported by all kinds of police (inaudible); the SWAT organization, Chief 
of Police organizations, countless thousands of others. 
House Debate, H.B. 108 (1990), add. B. During the Senate Debate, the Senate sponsor 
remarked that 
House Bill 108 amends a section of the code to include among the acts that 
a person can commit to constitute interference with an arresting officer the 
following: To refuse to perform an act required by lawful order of a peace 
officer making a lawful arrest which is necessary to effect the arrest, or 2) 
to refrain from performing any act the arresting officer lawfully orders him 
to perform where the officer's order is necessary to effect the arrest. 
Senate Debate, H.B. 108 (1990), add. B. 
To the extent they illuminate legislative intent, the 1990 sponsors' remarks are 
more consistent with the court of appeals' interpretation of section 76-8-305 than they are 
with petitioner's claim that the legislature was concerned to require entirely lawful arrests 
and detentions. Indeed, Rep. Turtle's remarks in 1990 echo the legislature's concern in 
1980 that individuals who have no objective basis upon which to know they were 
resisting a legitimate law enforcement officer not be prosecuted. Compare House Debate 
(1980), p.2, add. B, and House Debate (1990), add. B. Finally, even assuming it was 
uncertain before, the 1990 amendments make plain that the legislature intended to 
prohibit even nonforcefiil interference or resistance; otherwise, it would not have 
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prohibited the mere "refusal" to comply with lawful police orders. See section 76-8-
305(2)-(3), add. B. 
C. Gardiner is Not Meaningfully Distinguishable Here. 
Given the plain language of section 76-8-305 and the sound public policy 
recognized in Gardiner and progeny, see Part A, supra, the court of appeals properly 
determined that Utah's interference statute does not create a right to resist law 
enforcement "seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention." Section 76-8-305 In Point 
1(C) of his brief however, petitioner persists, that this case is distinguishable from 
Gardiner because, unlike Gardiner, petitioner did not commit an intervening crime 
giving nse to a lawful basis to arrest him for interference.4 Pet. Br. at 12-13. 
Pena-Flores recognizes that Gardiner "could be distinguished" because it 
"involved a prior illegal police act which was superseded by a lawful arrest that formed 
the basis of the interference charge[.]" Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323, f 13. See also 
Griego, 933 P.2d at 1008 (prior police illegality similarly superseded by a lawful arrest 
which formed basis of interference charge). However, Pena-Flores also correctly 
recognizes that the result in Gardiner and Griego did not turn on this factual distinction 
and therefore the attempt to distinguish them on this ground is "against the clear weight 
Petitioner also claims that Gardiner is distinguishable because he, unlike 
Gardiner, did not forcefully interfere or resist. Pet. Br. at 12-13. As set out in Part B, 
supra, this is a distinction without consequence under section 76-8-305, and particularly 
subsection (3), at issue here, which prohibits the mere "refusal to refrain from performing 
any act that would impede the arrest or detention/' 
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of authority and the language in the statute/' Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323, «f 13. In 
other words, any arguable factual distinction between Gardiner, Griego and Pena-Flores 
lacks legal significance. 
As first recognized in Gardiner, "in most states a citizen may not use force to 
resist an illegal arrest unless the officer uses excessive force." 814 P.2d at 572, nn.2-3 
(citation omitted). Therefore, even if Gardiner and Griego were factually 
distinguishable, the undergirding policy of Gardiner, as well as the majority trend, is 
away from sanctioning street brawls and toward settling disputes judicially. See Pena-
Flores, 2000 UT App 323, ^  13 ("Other states that have examined this issue have 
consistently determined that illegal police conduct does not justify a defendant interfering 
with a detention or arrest;') (citing Jurco v. State, 825 P.2d 909, 911,914 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1992) (defendant could not resist arrest even though disorderly conduct charge was 
invalid); People v. Curtis, 450 P.2d 33, 36-37 (Cal. 1969) ("self-help" is "anachronistic" 
and "not infrequently causes far graver consequences for both the officer and the suspect 
than does the unlawful arrest itself); Kessler v. Barowsky, 931 P.2d 641, 650 (Idaho 
1997) (person cannot resist arrest if he knows he is being arrested by a police officer); 
State v. Logan, 654 P.2d 492, 495 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982) (person cannot resist arrest by 
law enforcement even if he believes arrest is unlawful); State v. Laughlin, 933 P.2d 813, 
814-15 (Mont. 1997) (same); Fugere v. State, Taxation and Revenue Dep% Motor 
Vehicle Div., 897 P.2d 216, 223 (N.M. Ct. App.) (legal challenge to unlawful arrest can 
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be raised after the arrest, rather than by resisting arrest), cert, denied, 895 P.2d 671 (N.M. 
1995); State v. Castle, 616 P.2d 510, 512 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (generally person cannot 
resist arrest even when person knows he is innocent); State v. Mather, 626 P.2d 44, 47 
(Wash. App. 1981) (right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure does not create 
right to react unreasonably to an illegal detention)). See also State v. Valentine, 935 P.2d 
1294, 1304 (Wash. 1997) ("To endorse resistance by persons who are being arrested by 
an officer of the law, based simply on the arrested person's belief that the arrest is 
unlawful, is to encourage violence that could, and most likely would, result in harm to the 
arresting officer, the defendant or both. In our opinion, the better place to address the 
question of the lawfulness of an arrest that does not pose harm to the arrested person is in 
court and not on the street."). 
D. The Scope-of-Authority Test Adopted in Gardiner and Pena-
Flores Does Not Run Afoul of the Fourth Amendment. 
Notwithstanding, petitioner claims that the scope-of-authority test adopted in 
Pena-Flores violates the Fourth Amendment.^ Pet. Br. at 14-16. Contrary to petitioner's 
claim, the scope-of-authority test does not sanction unreasonable searches and seizures. 
As recognized by this Court, when there is a question as to the ultimate Fourth 
"Petitioner cursorily asserts that the scope-of-authority test also violates the state 
constitutional provision proscribing unreasonable searches and seizures. Pet. Br. at 14-
15. Because petitioner presents no separate argument or meaningful analysis under the 
state constitutional provision, this Court should not address his state constitutional claim. 
See State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, ^  28, P.3d ; State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 873 
n.6 (Utah), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 865 (1993). 
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Amendment validity of a police order the interference statute "'merely transfers the right 
of redress for a wrongful arrest to the orderly procedure of a court trial instead of a brawl 
in the streets/" Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 572 (quoting Bradshaw, 541 P.2d at 805) (Ellett, J. 
dissenting)). As further recognized in Gardiner, the self-help doctrine is extensively 
criticized precisely because "[a]n arrestee now has the 'benefits of liberal bonding 
policies, appointed counsel in the case of indigency, and the opportunity to be taken 
before a magistrate for immediate arraignment and preliminary hearing.'" Gardiner, 814 
P.2d at 572 (quoting State v. Richardson, 511 P.2d 263, 267 (Id. 1973), cert, denied, 414 
U.S. 1163 (1974)). Therefore, contrary to petitioner's allegation, the scope-of-authority 
test does not disregard the Fourth Amendment, but rather recognizes the legislature's 
preference for orderly judicial settlement of disputes over disorderly street brawls. See 
Curtis, 450 P.2d at 36-37 (duty to refrain from resisting unlawful arrest does not violate 
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable seizures). Indeed, given the 
complexities of Fourth Amendment law, the scope-of-authority test followed in Gardiner 
and progeny properly recognizes that '"the societal interest in the orderly settlement of 
disputes between citizens and their government outweighs any individual interest in 
resisting a questionable search. One can reasonably be asked to submit peaceably and to 
take recourse in his legal remedies.'" Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 572 (quoting State v. Doe, 
583 P.2d 464, 466-467 (N.M. 1978)). 
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Finally, the scope-of-authonty test does not give law enforcement carte blanche to 
perform illegal acts: police must act within the scope of law enforcement authority and 
with the indicia of lawfulness. In other words, the scope-of-authonty test "does not 
require the State to prove that the precise act the officer is performing is not legally 
challengeable, i.e., that the arrest or search being effected is entirely lawful and beyond 
chailenge[,]"rather, the test is "whether an officer is doing what he or she was employed 
to do oris 'engaging in a personal frolic of his or her own.'" 814 P 2d at 574 (quoting 
with approval, United States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241, 245 (2nd Cir.), cert, denied, 388 
U S. 917 (1967)). See also Clark v. Pangan, 2000 UT 37, f 20, 998 P.2d 268 (in civil 
assault context, an employee's conduct, even if forcible, falls within the scope of his 
employment unless force used is "unprovoked, highly unusual, and quite outrageous," 
such that he was acting "wholly outside" the scope of his authority). Thus, for example, 
if evidence established that an officer used excessive force in effecting an arrest such that 
he was acting "wholly outside" the scope of his authority as a peace officer, id. at | 26, 
the defendant may not be convicted of assault or interference - not because assault or 
resistance is legally justified - but because the prosecution failed to establish all elements 
of the offense. Cf. Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 291-292 (1963) (invalidating 
conviction for breach of peace when officer's command to vacate public park was 
obvious attempt to enforce unconstitutional racial discrimination). 
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Based on the above, the scope-of-authonty test does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. The court of appeals' sound reasoning should therefore be upheld. 
E. This Court Need Not and Should Not Reach Petitioner's Claim 
That Police Acted Without Reasonable Suspicion Here. 
In Point 1(D), petitioner asserts that police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain 
gang members, and that his "conviction for interference must be reversed because he did 
not interfere with- -or impede- -officers seeking to effect a lawful detention." Pet. Br. at 
17. As set forth previously, the ultimate correctness of the police calculation of 
reasonable suspicion here is irrelevant because police acted within the scope of law 
enforcement authority and with the indicia of lawfulness when they detained the gang 
members. See Part A, supra. 
In the unlikely event, however, the Court deems it relevant to the disposition of 
this case that police correctly calculated reasonable suspicion or not, the trial court has not 
addressed this issue {see R32:31-33), add. B. Therefore, the appropriate remedy is not 
reversal, but remand to allow the trial court to consider the existence of reasonable 
suspicion in the fust instance. See, e.g., Renn v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 904 P.2d 
677, 685 (Utah 1995); State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 227 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311,1 11, 14 P.3d 695, cert, granted, 29 P.3d 1 (Utah 2001); 
State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1253 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 
1991); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 889 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 
26 
(Utah 1990) (all remanding for further evaluation by the trial court regarding alternative 
ground for affirmance). 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm the court of appeals' decision because it correctly 
interprets Utah's interference statute to prohibit resisting or interfering with police 
"seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention," even when the arrest or detention is 
debatable under the Fourth Amendment. The legislature has spoken: redress for an 
alleged unlawful search or seizure under the Fourth amendment is not to be sought in the 
street, but in the courtroom. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this fj day of December, 2001, 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge: 
c
 I Defendant appeals his conviction of Interference 
with a Peace Officer in violation of Utah Code Ann. 5 
"6-8-305. arguing that a person cannot interfere 
unless an officer is seeking to make a lawful arrest or 
detention. Defendant argues that either the gang 
members were not detained or, in the alternative, if 
they were detained, the detention was not lawful. 
Thus, defendant claims under either theory that he 
was not interfering with a lawful arrest or detention as 
required by the statute. We affirm. 
Pane ; 
BACKGROUND [FN1] 
FN I The relevant facts of this case are not 
in dispute 
1 2 On July 10, 1999, members of the Provo City 
Police Department were present in American Fork to 
help patrol the Steel Days carnival. Based on 
information received from street contacts and 
anonymous tips, police believed there was a 
possibility of gang activity. Additionally, police 
were aware of gang fights the previous night and a 
week earlier between an American Fork gang and a 
Payson gang. Based on reports, police believed that 
the Payson gang might be coming to American Fork 
to retaliate tor the fight that occurred a week earlier 
•1 3 Dunng the carnival, officers dressed in clearlv 
marked police uniforms observed known gang 
members congregating in the back corner o( the 
carnival. Having identified the gang members, the 
officers proceeded to interview them and fill out 
interview cards for their files. During this process, 
police targeted certain individuals, whom they 
identified by tattoos and monikers, and escorted them 
to the front of the carnival, where the officers filled 
out interview cards and photographed them. 
«| 4 While police were interviewing the gang 
members, defendant, who was associating with them. 
but who was not known to police, told his friends that 
they did not have to talk with police or allow the 
police to take their pictures The police officers told 
defendant to shut his mouth and step back from the 
situation. Defendant, however, persisted in telling 
his friends that they did not have to cooperate At 
this point Officer Leavitt told defendant he had 
become "pan of the party" and instructed him to 
come up to the front to be interviewed. Once 
defendant was taken to the front. Officer Leavitt 
asked him for some identification. Defendant told 
Officer Leavitt that he did not have to show him his 
identification. Officer Leavitt asked defendant if he 
had any identification with him. Defendant 
responded that he had some in his pocket. Otficer 
Leavitt told defendant to show him the identification, 
but defendant refused. Officer Leavitt told defendant 
he was under arrest for failure to provide information 
to a police officer, handcuffed him, and removed the 
identification. After a bench trial, defendant was 
convicted of interfering with a peace otficer 
Defendant now appeals his conviction. 
*700 ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF RE\ TEW 
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[l][2j c 5 This case presents two questions. (I) Was 
the police encounter with gang members a detention, 
and (2) does Utah Code Ann. § 76-8- 305 require a 
lawful arrest or detention in order for a defendant to 
be charged with interfering with an officer? In 
determining whether the encounter was a detention, 
we review the trial court's factual findings under a 
clearly erroneous standard and its "conclusions based 
on the totality of those facts for correctness." State v 
Struhs. 940 P2d 1225, 1227 (UtahCt.App.1997). A 
question of statutory interpretation presents a 
question of law which is reviewed for correctness. 
See State v Widdison. 2000 UT App 185, «| 16. 4 
P.3d 100; State v Westerman, 945 P 2d 695, 696 
(Utah Ct.App. 1997). 
ANALYSIS 
I Was the Encounter a Level-Two Detention 
c
 6 Defendant argues that the encounter between 
police and gang members was merely a consensual 
level-one encounter, and thus he cannot be convicted 
of mterfenng with a peace officer because the statute 
requires either a level- two detention or a level-three 
arrest. Section 76-8-305 states: 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he 
has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable 
care should have knowledge, that a peace officer 
is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of 
that person or another and interferes with the 
arrest or detention by ..the arrested person's or 
another persons refusal to refrain from 
performing any act that would impede the arrest 
or detention. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305(3) (1999) (emphasis 
added). 
PH4][5][6] <| 7 Defendant argues that police were 
merely gathering information from the gang members, 
and thus the encounter was a consensual level-one 
encounter In a consensual level-one encounter, " ' 
'an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] 
and pose questions so long as the citizen is not 
detained against his will." ' " State v. Struhs, 940 
P2d 1225, 1227 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (citations 
omitted). In a level-two encounter, an officer 
may seize a person if the officer has an 'articulable 
suspicion' that the person has committed or is about 
to commit a crime Id (citations omitted). The 
difference between a consensual level-one encounter 
and a level-two detention is whether, "through a show 
ot physical force or authority, a person believes his 
freedom of movement is restrained." Id. 
Furthermore, the determination of whether a person is 
detained focuses on ' 'whether defendant 'remamiedi. 
not in the spirit of cooperation with the officers 
investigation, but because he believ[ed] he [was) not 
free to leave."'" Id (citations omitted). 
[7] «| 8 In this case, the facts indicate that the police 
interview of the gang members was a level-two 
detention. Specifically, not only were police 
interviewing and photographing known gang 
members believed to have been involved in a fight the 
previous night, but also police were physically 
escorting these individuals from the back of the 
carnival to the front of the carnival. Officer Leav itt 
testified that the officers had detained the gang 
members for purposes of the investigation. Based on 
the facts and Officer Leavitt's testimony, we cannot 
say the trial court's conclusion that police had 
detained the gang members was clearly erroneous 
*! 9 The State argues that the "seeking to effect" 
statutory language shows the Legislature intended the 
statute to cover a broader range of encounters than 
only detentions and arrests. However, because we 
conclude that the police did detain the gang members, 
we decline to address whether a person could be 
lawfully arrested for interfering with a level-one 
encounter. 
II. Does Section 76-8-305 Require a Lawful 
Detention 
1| 10 Next, defendant argues that the detention of the 
gang members was not supported by reasonable 
suspicion, and thus his conviction must be reversed 
because the statute requires a "lawful arrest or 
detention." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1999). As 
defendant points out: "In order to justify a seizure, a 
police officer must 'point to specific, *701 articulable 
facts which, together with rational inferences drawn 
from those facts, would lead a reasonable person to 
conclude [the defendant] had committed or was about 
to commit a crime.' " State v Struhs. 940 P 2d 1225, 
1228 (Utah Ct.App. 1997) (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted). 
[8] *[ 11 Although police must have reasonable 
suspicion in order to make a legal detention, the use 
of "lawful" in section ^6-8-305 does not 
automatically incorporate this standard in determining 
whether a person is guilty of interfering with a peace 
officer. So long as a police officer is acting within 
the scope of his or her authority and the detention or 
arrest has the indicia of being lawful, a person can be 
guilty of interfering with a peace officer even when 
Copr. e West 2001 No Claim to Ong. U S Govt. Works 
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the arrest or detention is later determined to be 
unlawful. As one court discussed. "The 
determination of whether an arrest is lawful is often 
difficult and should not be left to bystanders who may 
have only a limited knowledge of the relevant law and 
who may let their emotions control their judgment." 
State v Holeman, 103 Wash.2d 426, 693 P 2d 89, 92 
(1985). 
<1 12 Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has 
adopted a similar rule. In State v Gardiner, 814 
P2d 568 (Utah 1991), defendant was convicted of 
both assaulting a police officer and interfering with an 
arrest. In that case, defendant claimed that the 
officer had illegally entered a private building to 
investigate suspected criminal activity See id at 
575 Defendant claimed his initial assault against the 
officer when the officer entered the building and 
resistance after being informed that he was under 
arrest were justified because the underlying search by 
the officer was illegal. See id The supreme court 
rejected this argument, stating: "The fact that his 
attempted search was later found to be unlawful does 
not divest (the officer] of his authority." Id 
Similarly, in State v Griego, 933 P 2d 1003 (Utah 
Ct.App 1997), we assumed that "the police officers' 
warrantless entry into defendant's home and his 
seizure were illegal." Id. at 1008. Despite this 
illegality, we upheld defendant's conviction for 
interfering with an officer. See id. at 1009. 
«| 13 Although Gardiner and Griego could be 
distinguished on the ground that both involved a pnor 
illegal police act which was superseded by a lawful 
arrest that formed the basis of the interference charge, 
such a distinction is against the clear weight of 
authority and the language in the statute. Other 
states that have examined this issue have consistently 
determined that illegal police conduct does not justify 
a defendant interfering with a detention or arrest. 
See eg, Jurco v State, 825 P 2d 909, 911, 914 
(Alaska CtAppl992) (defendant could not resist 
arrest even though disorderly conduct charge was 
invalid); People v Curtis, 70 Cal.2d 347, 74 
CalRptr 713, 450 P 2d 33, 36-37 (1969) (duty to 
refrain from resisting unlawful arrest does not violate 
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable 
seizures), Kessler v Barowskv. 129 Idaho 647, 931 
P 2d 641, 650 (1997) (person cannot resist arrest if he 
knows he is being arrested by a police officer); State 
v Logan 8 Kan.App 2d 232, 654 P 2d 492, 495 
(1982) (person cannot resist arrest by law 
enforcement even if he believes arrest is unlawful); 
State v Laughlin 281 Mont. 179, 933 P 2d 813, 
Copr e West 2001 No CI; 
814-15 (1997) (same). F'tgere \ Suite Liurmn <>\i 
Revenue Dep't Motor I ehicle Div 120 \ M 2$ 
897 P2d 216. 223 (N M Ct App 1995) (legal 
challenge to unlawful arrest can be raised after the 
arrest, rather than by resisting arrest); State v Castle 
48 Or App. 15, 616 P 2d 510, 512 (1980) (generally 
person cannot resist arrest even when person knows 
he is innocent); State v ^father 28 Wash.App "00. 
626 P2d 44. 47 (1981) (right to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure does not create right 
to react unreasonably to an illegal detention). 
H 14 As the Wyoming Supreme Court noted: The 
legislative intent to prohibit that which would 
interfere with law enforcement officers as thev zo 
about their duties is manifest A person ot common 
intelligence need not guess at the meaning and 
intended application of the statute " \'e\uon v State 
698 P 2d 1149, 1152 (Wryo 1985) We believe that it 
is equally clear that our Legislature, by enacting 
section 76-8-305, intended to protect law 
enforcement officers who seek to discharge their 
official duties. 
*702 [9][10] 1| 15 "When construing a statute, our 
primary purpose is to give effect to the intent of the 
Legislature in light of the purpose the statute was 
meant to achieve." State v Wxddison. 2000 UT App 
185, <1 2U 4 P3d 100 (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). Additionally, " 'we presume that 
the Legislature used each term advisedly, and we give 
effect to each term according to its ordinary and 
accepted meaning.'" Id (citation omitted). 
<| 16 Defendant's argument that the statute requires a 
lawful arrest or detention reads out of the statute the 
phrase "seeking to effect." Given our prior case law 
and the Legislature's inclusion of the "seeking to 
effect" language, we believe that the statute is 
intended to protect law enforcement officers who are 
either making a lawful detention or arrest, or who are 
seeking to effect a lawful detention or arrest \n 
officer can seek to effect a lawful arrest or detention 
when he or she is acting within the scope of his or her 
authority and the detention or arrest has the indicia of 
being lawful. 
[11] «! 17 In this case, the police officers were 
wearing clearly marked police uniforms and were 
investigating known gang members and people 
associating with these gang members to gather 
information about two previous fights that had 
recently occurred Additionally, the police officers 
had information that one gang might be attempting to 
to Ong. U S Govt Works 
(Cite as: 14 P.3d oW. r~02) 
retaliate against another gang for one of the previous 
fights. To this end, police officers bneflv detained 
these individuals to gather information and update 
their files. Whether the police had reasonable 
suspicion to justify this detention is immaterial to 
defendant's conviction, because defendant was in no 
position to determine on his own whether the officers' 
actions were lawful 
CONCLUSION 
*f 18 Based on the evidence presented, the trial court 
correctly determined that police had seized the gang 
members at the carnival Furthermore, the poi^e 
wore uniforms which clearly identified them as law 
enforcement officers and they were acting in a 
manner that had all the indicia of a lawful police 
detention Therefore, defendant's interference with 
the police investigation was sufficient to support a 
conviction under section 76-8-305(3) Accordingly, 
we affirm defendant's conviction. 
<1 19 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W BENCH. Judge, 
JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Judge 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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1 guilty on this charge. 
2 MR. MURDOCK: Just a rebuttal. The fact that 
3 the statute does say that the defendant had knowledge 
4 or could have had knowledge that a peace officer was 
5 seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention, I 
6 think the officers here were clearly seeking to detain 
7 these individuals lawfully as part of an ongoing gang-
8 related investigation for gang crimes. I don't think 
9 there's any question about that. The defendant knew 
10 what was going on, knew they were officers. 
11 As far as this Fifth Amendment argument, the 
12 Fifth Amendment provides people with their right to 
13 not provide incriminating testimony. I fail to see 
14 how providing identification is incriminating under 
15 any circumstances. So, you know, I don't see how that 
16 applies at all to this case. We'd submit it. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. The key words here is the 
18 defendant had knowledge or that under the exercise 
19 of reasonable care should have had knowledge police 
20 officer was seeking to effect a lawful arrest or a 
21 detention. It's arrest or detention with knowledge. 
22 I believe the Court then focuses on three. 
23 The defendant's refusal to refrain from performing any 
24 act that will impede the arrest or detention. It's 
25 not that the arrest — 
-31-
1 MR. LINDSAY: I'm sorry, your Honor. Could 
2 you repeat that again. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. The focus here is the 
4 defendant's — on number three of the statute, the 
5 defendant's refusal to refrain from performing any 
6 act that will impede the arrest or detention. The 
7 testimony presented is the Court finds that he had 
8 reasonable knowledge. It was that he said he wasn't 
9 going to respond and asked others not to respond. 
10 I mean, there's no need to say that; if he had no 
11 knowledge that something was happening, he wouldn't 
12 have had to say that. The question here is his 
13 refusal to abstain from making those statements. 
14 In the totality of the circumstance, Court 
15 finds that the City has met it's burden, and that the 
16 defendant did interfere with the peace officer in 
17 making a lawful arrest. Seems to me — or detention. 
18 Seems to me the charge may say, ''Interference with 
19 peace officer making a lawful arrest." However, 
20 it is really pursuant to the statute three is "or 
21 detention." 
22 Whether they made a lawful arrest I think 
23 may or may not be the issue, but I don't think that's 
24 the issue. The issue here is "or detention," and 
25 whether he impeded the officer's performing any act 
-32-
to detain individuals and to gather information to 
then effectuate a lawful arrest. 
Court believes he had knowledge- I mean, 
there's no need to say, "I won't answer questions," 
or "You don't need to answer questions," if he had no 
knowledge that the officers were intending to gather 
information. The Court finds him guilty as charged. 
He wants to be sentenced today or later on? 
(Counsel conferring with defendant off the record) 
MR. LINDSAY: He'd like to be sentenced 
today, Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay- Statement in his behalf. 
MR. LINDSAY: Okay. The Court's aware of 
the circumstances here. Certainly not egregious. No 
testimony that he was actually physically interfering 
with the officers. The Court has all the testimony. 
I don't believe it was particularly egregious that any 
jail time would certainly be necessary in this case. 
Ask the Court to take that into account. As far as I 
can tell, the defendant has no prior record. Ask the 
Court to consider that. 
MR. MURDOCH: My concern, your Honor, is this 
was a potentially volatile situation, solely because 
of the defendant's actions. There was a potential 
for violence and for officers to get injured. Nothing 
-33-
1 happened, thankfully, but defendant had interfered. 
2 Never would have even been (inaudible). That's my 
3 main concern. I'd submit it on that. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. This is the sentence, 
5 then. Court will impose a maximum for a Class B, but 
6 I'm going to suspend jail time. There will be no jail 
7 time. I'm going to suspend all but $100 fine. He's 
8 ordered to pay $100, and that he's on probation for 
9 12 months. During this time he violate no laws. 
10 There's a minimal fine. However, I'm just 
11 putting him on probation because I believe — I think 
12 he needs to understand that this other problem would 
13 not have happened if he had just cooperated and just 
14 stayed out of the pictures. 
15 I don't want individuals — it may not have 
16 turned into a real volatile or egregious situation, 
17 but the potential was there, but I don't think the 
18 fact that it didn't, I don't want him to think that 
19 he can do that again. That's why the fine is minimal, 
20 and I just want him to stay out of trouble. 
21 MR. LINDSAY: Ask if the Court would be 
22 willing to stay execution of the sentence pending a 
23 possible appeal on this case. 
24 THE COURT: Okay, 30 days. 
25 (Trial concluded) 
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ADDENDUM C 
Amend. I UNITED STAfES CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT I 
[Religious and political freedom.) 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-reguiated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall 
not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT III 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, 
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war. but in a 
manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due pro-
cess of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous cnme, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases ansmg in the land or naval forces, 
or m the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law. nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which distnct shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the .Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
snail exceed twenty dollars, the right of tnai by jury shall be 
preserved, and no fact tned by a jury, shall be otherwise 
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according 
to the rules of the common law. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
[Bail — Punishment.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exce.-, 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflict^* C" 
AMENDMENT DC 
[Rights retained by people.] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain n?h 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained*' ^ ' 
people. ^' •'. 
AMENDMENT X 
[Powers reserved to states or people.] 
The powers not delegated to the I'm ted State* 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are re! '*" 
the States respectively, or to the people. 
.AMENDMENT XI 
(Suits against states — Restriction of judicial po* 
The judicial power of the United States shall not ^ 
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, comme---," 
prosecuted against one of the United States by C/ -^ 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreizrii <•'-
AMENDMENT XII 
[Election of President and Vice-President.] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and 
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whorr 
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state"!---
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person •.-•*. 
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted c-r.'. 
Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of hi ><• 
sons voted for as President, and of all persons voted :"or .'. 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each. wfi;c: 
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the ,ry," 
the Government of the United States, directed to the Pr*. 
dent of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shail. .a •.<> 
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open L. 
the certificates and the votes shall then be counted.-?* 
person having the greatest number of votes for President. 
shall be the President, if such number be a majority ;f j * 
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person *av» 
such majority, then from the persons having the higr.«i 
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for u 
President, the House of Representatives shall choose ;n=ec-
ately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the Presides 
the votes shall be taken by states, the representation \r.z 
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose ar-L. 
consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the sui« 
and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a :f.o« 
And if the House of Representatives shall not cr.oo* • 
President whenever the nght of choice shall devolve -3^ 
them, before the fourth day of March next following, tnen J* 
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case t?^ 
death or other constitutional disability of the President.-"1* 
person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-Prei.^ '' 
shall be the Vice-President, if such number beamajoruv;:-'* 
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person ru*' 
majority, then from the two highest numbers on tne -*• -
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum :or -* 
purpose shail consist of two-thirds of the whote nutr.*f 
Senators, and a majority of the whole number ^ ^ 
necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ine"V 
to the office of President shall be eligible to that ;' ' * 
President of the United States. 
76-8-305. Interference with arresting officer. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the exercise of 
reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or 
detention of that person or another and interferes with the arrest or detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from performing any act that 
would impede the arrest or detention. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-305, enacted by L. 1981, ch. 62, § 1; 1990, ch. 274, § 1. 
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1981, ch. 62, § 1 repealed former § 76-8-305, as enacted by § 
76-8-305, relating to interference with law enforcement official seeking to detain interferor or another, and 
enacted present § 76-8-305. 
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CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDIRE Ch. 62 
The descriptions shall include information about phvsiological and anatomical 
characteristics, brain and heart function, and the presence ot external mem-
bers and internal organs during the applicable stages ot development, and 
(c) Descriptions of abortion procedures used in current medical practice at 
the various stages of growth ot the unborn child including, the surgical proce-
dure to be used and any reasonably foreseeable complications and risks to the 
mother, including those related to subsequent childbeanng. 
(2) No abortion shall be performed unless, prior to the abortion, the 
attending physician certifies in writing that the materials referred to in subsec-
tion (1) ot this section have been provided to the woman, if possible, at least 
24 hours before performance of the abortion. 
(3) This section is inapplicable to an abortion if the department certifies 
in writing that the materials referred to in subsection (I) are not presentlv 
available. 
If anv provision of this section is invalidated by a court, it shall not effect 
the validity of the balance of its provisions. 
(4) When due to a serious medical emergency, time does not permit 
compliance with subsection 76-7-305 5 (2). the provisions ot that subsection 
shall not apply. 
Approved March 28. 1981. 
CHAPTER 62 
H B No 85 (Passed January 29. 1981 In effect Mav i: lysi) 
RESISTING LAWFUL ARREST 
AN ACT RELATING TO THE MISDEMEANOR OF INTERFERING WITH A LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICER MAKING A LAWFLL ARREST. 
THIS ACT REPEALS AND REENACTS SECTION 76-8-305, LTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, 
AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 1%, LAWS OF LTAH 1973. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section I. Section repealed and reenacted. 
Section 76-8-305, Utah Code Annotated 1953. as enacted by Chapter 196. 
Laws ot* Utah 1973. is repealed and reenacted to read: 
76-8-305. Interference with peace officer making lawful arrest. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by 
the exercise of reasonable care, bhould have knowledge, that a peace otficer 
is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of himself or another and 
interferes with such arrest or detention by use of torce or by use of any 
weapon. 
Ch. 63 CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDLRE 
Approved February 20. 1981. 
CHAPTER 63 
H. B No 86 (Passed Februarv 5. 1981 [n ettect May 12. 1981 ) 
AUTOMOBILE NEGLIGENCE - DEATH OR INJURY 
AN ACT RELATING TO INJURIES AND DEATH CALSED BY THE NEGLIGENT OPERA. 
TION OF AN AUTOMOBILE; PROVIDING FOR A STANDARD OF NEGLIGENCE: AND 
MAKING CERTAIN CHANGES IN FORM. 
THIS ACT AMENDS SECTION 76-5-207, IT AH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS LAST 
AMENDED BY CHAPTER 32, LAWS OF LTAH 1974, AND SECTION 41-6-44, ITAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 243. LAWS OF LTAH 
1979. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section amended. 
Section 76-5-207, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by Chapter 
32, Laws of Utah 1974, is amended to read: 
76-5-207. Automobile homicide. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes automobile homicide if the actor, while 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance, or any 
drug, to a degree which renders the actor incapable of safely driving a 
vehicle, causes the death of another by operating a motor vehicle in a negli-
gent manner. For the purposes of this section, the standard of negligence 
shall be that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care 
which ordinarily reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like or simi-
lar circumstances. 
(2) The presumption established by [section] subsection 4l-6-44(b) [e$ 
the Utah Motor Vehicle Act), relating to blood alcohol percentages, shall be 
applicable to this section^ and any chemical test administered on a defendant 
with his consent or after his arrest under this section, whether with or against 
his consent, shall be admissible in accordance with the rules of evidence. 
(3) For purposes of [the automobile homicide] this section, a motor 
vehicle constitutes any self-propelled vehicle and includes, but is not limited 
to, any automobile, truck, van, motorcycle, train, engine, watercraft, or air-
craft. ' 
(4) Automobile homicide is a felony of the third degree. 
Section 2. Section amended. 
Section 41-6-44. Utah Code Annotated 1953. as last amended by Chapter 
243, Laws of Utah 1979, is amended to read: 
Laws of t ' t a h - l'J90 
CHAPTER 274 
H. 8. No. 108 
P.\—o-i Jar Man il. ; J00 
\pprfAed March 1 \ \J9Q 
citfective April 1). 1990 
INTERFERENCE WITH 
ARRESTING OFFICER - AMENDMENT 
8y Daniel H Tuttle 
AN ACT RELATING TO CRIMINAL LAW; 
AMENDING THE OFFENSE OF INTERFER-
ING WITH AN ARRESTING OFFICER. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF LTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS: 
76-3-305. AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 62. LAWS 
OF UTAH 1981 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of'the >tate of Utah: 
Section I. Section .Amended. 
Section 76—S—305. Leah Code .Annutated 1953. as 
enacted by Chapter 62. Laws o( Ltah 1981. :s 
amended to read: 
T6-£-305. Interference with arresting officer. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he 
has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable 
caret. i should have knowledge, that a peace officer is 
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of [h*m-
?e*fl that person or another and interferes with 
juehi the arrest or detention by: 
_L use of force or [by une of! any weaponf:]; 
2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any 
act required by lawful order: 
a' necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
b i made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or 
detention, or 
] the arrested person's or another person's refus-
al to refrain from performing any act that would Im• 
pede the arrest or detention. 
HOLSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DISCUSSING HOLSE BILL NO. 85 
Speaker of the House: This bill needs to be read in the amendment form 
Clerk: House bill Number 85, Resisting Lawful Arrest, by Orval C Hamson Be it enacted by 
the Legislature of the State of Utah 
Mr. Speaker: Representative Hamson9 
Rep. Orval C. Harrison: This bill deals with the cnme of resisting arrest If you were to look 
in your Utah Code to 76-8-305 you wouldn't even find that statute in the books Instead it would 
say "unconstitutional" The state supreme court in the case of State v Bradshaw declared 
unconstitutional a statute dealing with resisting arrest The reason it was declared unlawful was 
because pnmanly it did not require an affirmative showing by the prosecution that the arrest was 
a lawful arrest Consequently we have put together a statute here, and the statewide association 
of prosecutors have been involved in this, which would now redefine this cnme to require a 
lawful arrest I'm having passed to you a memorandum which explains the situation What we 
are trying to do is to get on the books a statute that would define the cnme of resisting arrest and 
it would require a lawful arrest I'd be glad to respond to any questions if there are any 
Mr. Speaker: Representative Contadine? 
Rep. Contadine: Mr Speaker, this is not to this bill. I had my light on before this bill, so 
whatever 
Mr. Speaker: OK Representative Gardner7 
Rep. Gardner: Would Representative Hamson yield to a question9 
Rep. Harrison: Uh huh. 
Rep Gardner: Could you just tell me to make sure I understand. Could you tell me what an 
unlawful arrest is9 
Rep. Harrison: An unlawful arrest, of course we're talking in general terms here, would be an 
arrest when the officer attempting to effect an arrest did not have reasonable grounds to do so, 
was not probable cause in any way, was trying to effect an arrest which was unlawful 
Rep. Gardner: I guess what's troubling me is not that I oppose your concept, but what's 
troubling me is that it seems to me like it might be a matter of judgment as to what's lawful or 
unlawful I might think its unlawful because I haven't done anything wrong - and I guess how do 
you - who makes the decision as to whether there is sufficient reason? 
Rep Harrison: Let me respond to that by indicating that what is and is not a lawful arrest I'm 
sure is the subject matter of numerous different lawsuits and court decisions, and I don't involve 
myself in the practice of criminal law so I couldn't define it too well. But I'm sure that the 
ultimate decision as to what is a lawful arrest would be something decided by court decision. 
And, I might add also that the statute which we have here has been patterned after a California 
statute which has been declared to be constitutional. 
Rep. Gardner: Thank you. 
Mr. Speaker: Representative Hillyard? 
Rep. Hillyard: Would Representative Harrison yield to another question? 
Rep. Harrison: Yes. 
Rep. Hillyard: Has consideration been given to the potential problem of say a knock on a door 
at 2 o'clock in the morning and a man saying that he's a police officer and then proceeding to 
come in the home and for some reason you seek to protect yourself or your home. To "some 
protection/' that were that the police officer either be properly identified or some type of 
protection to a private citizen who may be concerned about someone he does not know for sure 
to be a police officer? 
Rep. Harrison: Yes. The bill expressly requires that the person who is charged with this offense 
of resisting a lawful arrest must have knowledge that the person is a police officer or else in the 
exercise of reasonable care, he should have some information sufficient to be put on notice that 
the individual was a peace officer. So if the peace officer does not identify himself or if there's 
no reasonable basis for the person charged to know that this is a police officer then the elements 
of the crime would not be made out. 
Mr. Speaker: Representative Christiansen? 
Rep. Christiansen: Thank you Mr. Speaker. I don't know how many of you have been arrested. 
Hope not very many. But seems like there's been a couple in our state and if you go by the 
record there was, as I recall, 304 officers assaulted. All they was trying to arrest you and I 
because we was breaking the law. I think this is too high a number and I support this bill. 
Mr. Speaker: I see no further lights of persons wishing to speak to the bill. Representative 
Harrison, would you like to sum up? 
Rep. Harrison: I think its been adequately covered, thank you. 
Mr. Speaker: Voting will now be open on House Bill 85. 
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SENATE VOTING ON HOUSE BILL 108 
President of the Senate: House Bill 108. 
Clerk: House Bill Number 108, Interference with Arresting Officer amendment, by 
Representative Tuttle. 
Mr. President: Anyone ask to carry that one? Senator McMullen? Senator Marrin? 
Mr. Marrin: Is that the one on the Tar Sands? 
Mr. President: No, it's a Hou . . . 
Clerk: This is Interference with Arresting Officer, by Representative Tuttle. 
Mr. President: Who's supposed to carry ( ? )? 
Senator Cornaby: I am. 
Mr. President: Senator Cornaby-House Bill 108? OK. 
(Some mumbling) 
Senator Cornaby: It's a good bill Mr. President. 
Mr. President: What's it about? 
(Some joking) 
Senator Corby: House Bill 108 amends a section of the code to include among the acts that a 
person can commit to constitute interference with an arresting officer the following: To refuse to 
perform an act required by lawful order of a peace officer making a lawful arrest which is 
necessary to effect the arrest, or 2) to refrain from performing any act the arresting officer 
lawfully orders him to perform where the officer's order is necessary to effect the arrest. 
Mr. President: The President will rule and declare that a quorum is present, (unintelligible) to 
the question say "yea". 
Senators: Yea. 
Mr. President: Did the Chair here see anyone say "nay" to the question? 
OK. If not, I'll direct that the unanimous vote of the Senators present be cast in favor of the bill. 
Senator Levitt is right here. House Bill 108 shows 24 aye's, no nays, 5 being absent, 0 passes. 
Be signed by the president of the session and returned to the House without further action. 
HOLSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DISCLSSING HOUSE BILL 108 
Mr. Speaker: We'll turn now to HL ase Bill 108 Madam, read in court 
Clerk: House Bill 108, Interference with Arresting Officer Amendment, by Representative 
Daniel H Tuttle Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah. 
Mr. Speaker: Representative Tuttle9 
Rep. Tuttle: Thank you Mr Speaker. What this bill does is if you interfere, knowingly interfere 
with an arrest of a person that's being apprehended by a policeman, this puts you in a Class B 
misdemeanor park If you know, if you're in a crowded area and the policeman says to do 
something and you don't hear it, you don't have to worry about it But if you do knowingly 
know that you're avoiding arrest of you or the person you're trying to help, then you're in 
trouble This is supported by all kinds of police ( 9 ), the SWAT organization. Chief of Police 
organizations, countless thousands of others 
Mr. Speaker: To the Bill, House Bill 108,1 see no lights Representative 
Rep. Tuttle: Thank you Mr Speaker. 
Mr. Speaker: Voting's open on House Bill 108. 
